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Boudreaux and Selgin's (1990) fascinating discussion of L. Albert Hahn - "a precursor of 
Keynesianism and the monetarist counter-revolution" - deserves the attention of economists.  
Hahn had been a banker, an honorary Professor at the University of Frankfurt, and an influential 
inter-war monetary theorist (Ellis 1934, 220).  In 1941 he joined that remarkable trans-Atlantic 
migration of German-speaking talent (von Mises, Hayek, Machlup, Haberler etc.).  Until 1953, 
he taught at the New School for Social Research in New York, which from its inception (1919) 
had been a magnet for European exiles, and for refugees from Columbia University.1  
 
In the third edition (1930) of his Volkswirtschaftliche Theorie des Bankkredits, Hahn renounced 
the thesis contained in the first edition (1920), which he described as "a 'credit expansion theory 
of employment' very similar to that of Keynes" in The General Theory.  This put him in "a 
somewhat peculiar position" (Hahn 1945, 28-9).   As Hayek and Haberler noted, Hahn had 
invoked Malthus' analysis of effective demand to argue against the validity of Say's Law; and he 
developed a liquidity preference approach to explain the determination of interest rates, in 
opposition to the Quantity Theory and loanable funds approach.  Relying on the notion of forced 
savings, rather than money illusion, he also believed that credit expansion (even with 
"leakages") could promote an ongoing increase in employment.   
 
Just when Keynesian thinking had become standard fare, Hahn began to develop ideas that 
would become standard in the 1970s: a "natural rate" of output, an emphasis on voluntary 
unemployment, and a belief that entrepreneurs will usually predict the future more successfully 
than economic theorists (Boudreaux and Selgin 1990).      
 
The purpose of this note is to add some further information about Hahn's influence (section 2): 




accurately be described as a "proto-monetarist" (section 3); and to provoke some discussion 
about the sociology of knowledge in the economics profession (section 4). 
 
2.Was Hahn's work ignored in the post-war period? 
Boudreaux and Selgin concluded that few theorists have taken note of Hahn's work (1990, 261): 
he produced no school, and "is today virtually forgotten" (1990, 262); and his proto-monetarism 
was largely ignored in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s (1990, 277).  The first two conclusions are 
largely correct; the third less so.   Hahn's work was cited by at least one important source in 
what Gottfried Haberler (of Harvard University) called "the last great debate on inflation in the 
1950s" (1972, 133).  The 'great debate' in the 1970s was over the Phillips curve trade-off.  In the 
1950s, Sumner H. Slichter (also of Harvard University) - "undoubtedly the best known 
economist of his day to the American community generally..." (Dunlop 1961, xxi), and "perhaps 
our best economic forecaster" (Samuelson 1961, 24) - advocated the proposition that creeping 
inflation could be permanently tolerated.  The context was the Delphic Oracular quality of the 
1946 United States Employment Act, and the apparent incompatibility of the pursuit of 'full' 
employment with price stability (Leeson 1997). 
 
For the last seven years of his life, Slichter was involved in an ongoing dispute with the editor of 
The Journal of Commerce.  In the 1950s, this publication rivalled The Wall Street Journal in 
terms of influence;2 and was one of the  forums for the debate about inflation.  Slichter offered a 
ten year prediction, which connects almost exactly with Milton Friedman's famous 1967 
American Economic Association Presidential prediction of stagflation.  In a letter to the editor 
on February 27, 1957, Slichter suggested a ten year comparative prediction between his views 
and the views of "The Journal of Commerce and the views of many economists in the United 
States and Europe who declare that creeping inflation must become galloping inflation and end 
in collapse.  A backward look ... would be an appropriate editorial for the first issue of The 




February 13 1957, which had concluded that "creeping inflation will not lead to additional 
employment but will ultimately cause a decline in employment".  The authority cited by this 
editorial was "L. Albert Hahn, successful Swiss banker-economist, whose book 'Common Sense 
Economics', translated into English, was published in this country just a week or so ago". 
 
Although Hahn's rejection of mainstream Keynesian analysis made it increasingly difficult for 
him to publish his views in professional outlets, his few academic journal publications also 
appear to have played an important part in early post-war discussions on monetary policy  
(Kaufman 1969, 195-6).  He published a lengthy article in the American Economic Review 
(1945) and three of his works were cited in the AEA Selected Readings in Monetary Theory 
(1956, 466, 471, 495).  In the United Kingdom, his arguments were seen (in the Economic 
Journal) as "scor[ing] some undeniable hits" (Croome 1957, 717), and the Economist cited him 
as the author of "a searching attack on the recent policies of the German Federal Bank" (24 
August 1957, 602).  He was also regarded as a leading opponent of the Bretton Woods system 
of fixed exchange rates (Lipfert 1966; Yeager 1958, 429; Yeager 1959, 356; Bernholz 1979, 
10).  But since he was regarded as "one of the foremost living anti-Keynesians" (Hein 1962, 
507; Oanh 1960, 97), his influence was limited.   
 
3.Hahn, Phillips and the Monetarist $ Model. 
Hahn clearly made an important theoretical contribution to the "last great debate on inflation", 
and it is worthwhile to compare this contribution to later developments.  But the similarity 
between Hahn and monetarism seems over-stretched in at least two areas.  First, under the 
section headed "Hahn as proto-monetarist", Boudreaux and Selgin (1990, 273) point out that 
Hahn "observed that at the end of the inflationary boom, when 'compensating reactions' are 
taking place, the rate of inflation declines, but not by as much as the decline in employment 
caused by the higher real wages being bargained for by labour".   Milton Friedman (1968), 




followed by stagflation - increasing rates of inflation and unemployment.  Hahn's work seems 
closer in spirit to Phillips' seminal empirical article.  Phillips (1958, Fig. 2 - Fig. 7, 286-9) found 
that in a succession of trade cycles, the inflationary boom was always followed by an increase in 
unemployment (and usually accompanied by a reduction in inflation). 
 
Secondly, under the same section, Boudreaux and Selgin (1990, 276) note that "Hahn believed 
that reductions in demand that occur as the economy rids itself of maladjustments can lead to 
disequilibrating declines in income by causing the demand for speculative money balances to 
increase.  He called this a 'deflationary depression' ".   
 
But the monetarist mechanism is an equilibrating story which can be described, in inflation-
unemployment space, using the analogy of a $  (or an 'S' spiked by a vertical natural-rate of 
unemployment).  The macrosystem is constrained to move along this 'S' shaped trajectory.  
Along the top half of the 'S', a Keynesian fall in the price of money can only be temporary  - an 
inflationary boom can only dissipate itself, as Keynesian money turns 'dishonest'.  Along the 
bottom half of the 'S', a monetarist rise in the price of money will dissipate itself by inducing 
self-destructing delusions about inflationary expectations (the short-run Phillips curve will shift 
inwards as unemployment increases).  Monetarist money becomes 'honest', as the rate of 
inflation is forced down by the reduced rate of growth of the money supply.  Monetary 
discipline, tied to accommodating wage behaviour, can be relied upon to produce permanent 
reductions in both inflation and unemployment.  
 
But weak or non-existent equilibrating tendencies make policy-induced disinflation (with 
recession as an undesirable side-effect) a somewhat dubious tool.  The possibility of a 
prolonged 'deflationary depression' would tend to suggest that recessions should be viewed as 
something other than a temporary side-effect of the monetary contraction cure.3   This type of 




Expectations Augmented Phillips (N-REAP) curve approach.4 
 
4.Influence and economists 
We lack a systematic study of influence (or the lack of it) in the economics profession - 
especially when it comes to those who dissent from orthodoxy.   Hahn and his like, were largely 
rolled over by the Keynesian juggernaut.  We lack a systematic study of what happened to 
people like Hahn in their three decades in the anti-Keynesian wilderness.   
 
As a self-confessed "collector of intellectual schools",  Milton Friedman - the most influential 
sociologist of knowledge of his generation of economists - has reflected on the New York 
environment in which Hahn and von Mises propagated their views: "One of the great 
economists of all time, Ludwig von Mises ... was barely tolerated for years in a peripheral 
academic position at New York University ... Had my career been in New York ... I would have 
been regarded as a 'kook' and no doubt would have begun to act like one even earlier than I did" 
(1974, 11, 16).  As for Hahn, the "reverse process" of  his relationship with orthodoxy made him 
appear to a British observer as a "curiosity"; an eccentric courting the same destiny as Major 
Douglas, despite having "his finger on certain weak points of the current economic creed" 
(Croome 1957, 716, 718).   
 
Age must also have been a factor: anti-Keynesians tended to be pre-Keynesians of an older 
vintage.  Ill-temper may be another feature (Gordon 1949).  Friedman, the most successful anti-
Keynesian of them all, remains refreshingly free of the spleen that seems to have marred the 
chances for influence of some of his fellow-travellers.  Hahn, in his disappointment, may have 
fallen into this trap - see his reference to "the tendency of economists 'to swing pendulum-like' 
from one set of 'noxious extremes to another' " (cited by Boudreaux and Selgin 1990, 274-5).   
 




his collected writings (1920, 1925, 1929, 1949, 1960 and 1969); which had been intended to 
honour his eightieth birthday (Montaner 1970; Hein 1962; Boudreaux and Selgin 1990, 261). 
He had problems getting some of his work published: "his dissenting voice had little chance of 
being heard.  He accepted this.5  In 1949 he wrote, 'Life has taught me that men, including 
economists, are influenced chiefly by their latest experience' " (Boudreaux and Selgin 1990, 






*This note has benefited from comments from George Selgin and an anonymous referee. 
 
1.The Frankfurt School also had its origins in the inter-war proliferation of social science 
research institutes; and after the war, Marcuse, Horkheimer and Neumann founded a 
Frankfurt School in exile at Columbia University.         
 
2.I am grateful to the referee for alerting me to the importance of the Journal of Commerce  in 
the 1950s.  
 
3.George Selgin has noted that "your point concerning the difference between Hahn and 
monetarists is well-taken; Hahn's discussion of 'deflationary depression' differs from that 
of later monetarists.  It is, perhaps, more akin to arguments of certain pre-Keynesian 
quantity theorists, like Irving Fisher" (correspondence 17 April, 1995). 
 
4.If disinflation is more perilous than the N-REAP model suggests, then this, of course, remains 
one of the strongest reasons for preventing the outbreak of inflation in the first place. 
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